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IN RE SIMON SHIAO TAM, A CONCURRING OPINION: SECTION 1052(A) OF THE 
LANHAM ACT IMPOSES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION THAT IS NO 
LONGER JUSTIFIED BY CONGRESS’S SPENDING POWER 
 
Francis A. Raso* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Simon Shiao Tam is the lead singer, songwriter, and “front-man” of an Asian American 
rock band that controversially refers to itself as “The Slants.”1  While Mr. Tam admits that his 
band’s name is derived from an ethnic slur for people of Asian descent, he nonetheless seeks 
federal trademark registration for the moniker, which he regularly utilizes in promotional 
materials.2  His stated intent is a desire to recapture the negative stereotypes typically associated 
with Asian American culture, and to redefine them in a more positive light—as sources of Asian 
pride and accomplishment.3  But Mr. Tam’s good faith efforts to seek semiotic change were 
thwarted when an examining attorney in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
refused to register his proposed mark on grounds that the term is likely disparaging to a “substantial 
composite” of the Asian American population.4  The examining attorney cited section 1052(a) of 
the Lanham Act as statutory grounds for the refusal.5   
                                                          
* J.D., 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Journalism and Public Relations, 2013, Seton Hall University.  
I would like to thank Professor Thomas Healy for lending me his constitutional expertise and providing me with 
valuable feedback throughout the writing of this Comment.  I would also like to thank Kyle Brown for all of his helpful 
guidance and encouragement.  
1 In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
2 See id. 
3 See id. at 570.  Mr. Tam represents but one example of dozens of trademark applicants who have set forth similar 
reasoning in support of their potentially disparaging proposed trademarks. See Megan M. Carpenter & Kathryn T. 
Murphy, Calling Bullshit on the Lanham Act: The 2(a) Bar for Immoral, Scandalous, and Disparaging Marks, 49 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 465, 476–77 (2011) (“Currently, there are many groups attempting to take once derogatory terms 
and internalize them, make them their own, and in the process strip them of hateful meaning.”); see also Llewellyn 
Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark Law 
After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 219 (2005) (referring to the foregoing concept as 
“semiotic sovereignty,” a process by which disenfranchised communities seek empowerment by transforming 
offensive pejoratives into symbols of pride).  
4 Tam, 785 F.3d at 568–69.       
5 Id. at 568. 
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Section 1052(a)—among other things—allows the PTO to refuse to register a trademark 
that consists of “immoral,” “disparaging,” or “scandalous” subject matter.6  The PTO frequently 
cites this provision when refusing to register the proposed marks of applicants who strive to combat 
prejudice by using their products and/or services to redefine cultural stereotypes.7  Prior to In re 
Tam, the longstanding Federal Circuit precedent of In re McGinley upheld the constitutionality of 
section 1052(a) against First Amendment challenge, reasoning that the PTO’s refusal to grant 
trademark registration does not infringe upon an applicant’s First Amendment right to nevertheless 
use the unregistered mark in commerce.8  The McGinley decision has since been the subject of 
widespread, biting criticism.9 
Mr. Tam appealed the PTO’s decision, and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) 
affirmed the examiner’s refusal, citing dictionary definitions, other reference works, and isolated 
reactions from the relevant community as evidence of likely disparagement.10  The Federal Circuit 
                                                          
6 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2015). 
7 See, e.g., In re Heeb Media, L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (rejecting registration of the mark, 
“HEEB,” despite the fact that the founders of Heeb Magazine—a monthly periodical aimed primarily at Jewish 
readers—hoped to “revitalize American Jewish life” and “transvalue the term ‘heeb’ from an epithet into a term of 
Jewish empowerment”).  Fairly recently, a PTO examiner rejected the San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle 
Contingent’s application for the proposed mark “DYKES ON BIKES” on grounds that the mark would likely offend 
members of the lesbian community.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78281746 (filed July 31, 2003).  Since 
as early as 1976, this group has actively participated in countless parades and other events promoting homosexual 
pride. Id. 
8 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
9 See, e.g., Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., dissenting); Stephen Baird, Moral 
Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 
TRADEMARK REP. 661, 685–86 (1993); Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging 
Trademark: Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for Words That Offend?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 415, 
443–44 (2001); Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on Sports Team Names: Has Political 
Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 SPORTS LAW J. 65, 66–67 (1997); Ron Phillips, A Case for Scandal and Immorality: 
Proposing Thin Protection of Controversial Trademarks, 17 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 67–68 (2008); Jendi 
Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why “Immoral” and “Scandalous” Trademarks Should Be Federally 
Registrable, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 197 (1996); see also In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
McGinley analysis was cursory . . . and decided at a time when the First Amendment had only recently been applied 
to commercial speech.  First Amendment jurisprudence on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the protection 
accorded to commercial speech has evolved significantly since the McGinley decision.”).  
10 Tam, 785 F.3d at 569. 
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initially reaffirmed the Board’s decision, but subsequently vacated its judgment and granted Mr. 
Tam a rehearing en banc on the sole issue: Does section 1052(a) violate the First Amendment?11 
Upon rehearing, the Federal Circuit vacated its earlier judgment, partially overruled 
McGinley, struck down the disparagement provision of section 1052(a) as unconstitutional on its 
face, and permitted Mr. Tam to register his trademark.12  The court reaffirmed McGinley’s 
proposition that section 1052(a)’s disparagement provision does not technically ban any speech.13  
However, the court held that the provision imposes an “unconstitutional condition” in that it 
deprives disparaging marks of vitally important business protections, thereby tending to indirectly 
discourage prospective trademark registrants from using offensive language.14  The court also 
ruled that the statutory language was viewpoint-discriminatory on its face (and therefore 
presumptively invalid) because the PTO’s exclusion of a mark from the Principal Register 
necessarily depends on its disapproval of the mark’s message15—a direct violation of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence mandating content neutrality in governmental restraints on speech.16   
Moreover, the Federal Circuit held that section 1052(a)’s disparagement prohibition is not 
saved by either the “commercial speech” or “government speech” doctrines.  With regard to the 
former, the court reasoned that it is not the mark’s commercial nature as a source identifier, but 
rather its “expressive character” that serves as the basis for a finding of unregistrability.17  With 
respect to the latter, the court held that a trademark owner’s use of his or her mark is private speech 
                                                          
11 In re Tam, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir.), vacating 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
12 See generally Tam, 808 F.3d 1321.  
13 See id. at 1339. 
14 See id. at 1339–45. 
15 Id. at 1334–37. 
16 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 
(1972). 
17 Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337–38. 
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rather than government speech.18  The court reasoned that the purpose of identifying a business 
owner’s goods is highly antithetical to any notion of government control,19 and that neither the 
regulatory activity of issuing a registration certificate nor the trademark owner’s inclusion of an 
“®” symbol converts this speech from private to government status.20 
Finally, the court held that Congress may not exclude disparaging trademarks from the 
Principal Register on the grounds that registration constitutes a government subsidy.  Even though 
“the scope of the subsidy cases has never been extended to a ‘benefit’ like recognition of legal 
rights in speakers against private interference,”21 the court seemed to assume arguendo that federal 
registration constitutes a subsidy.  Nevertheless, the court held that Congress does not remain “free 
to distribute the legal rights it creates without respecting First Amendment limits on content and 
viewpoint discrimination.”22       
              The recent grant of a rehearing in In re Tam demonstrates the questionable, wishy washy 
status of section 1052(a).  While the Federal Circuit seems to have taken a definitive position on 
the provision’s constitutionality, the issue remains heated and relevant in other jurisdictions due 
to controversies surrounding the PTO’s cancellation of allegedly disparaging trademarks affiliated 
with discriminatory sports team names.23  This strongly suggest that the United States Supreme 
Court will grant certiorari on the issue sometime in the near future.  Additionally, the Federal 
                                                          
18 Id. at 1345. 
19 See id. at 1345 (“The fact that COCA COLA and PEPSI may be registered trademarks does not mean the government 
has endorsed these brands of cola, or prefers them over other brands.”). 
20 Id. at 1347. 
21 Id. at 1351. 
22 Id. 
23 See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015); see also Eugene Volokh, Federal 
Appeals Court Decides ‘The Slants’ Case: Excluding ‘Disparaging Marks’ from Trademark Registration Violates the 
First Amendment, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/12/22/federal-appeals-court-decides-the-slants-case-excluding-disparaging-marks-from-
trademark-registration-violates-the-first-amendment/ (explaining that the Tam decision is not binding on the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which is currently considering the continued registrability of the “REDSKINS” mark).  
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Circuit’s en banc opinion in Tam expressly limits its holding to section 1052(a)’s disparagement 
prohibition, thereby leaving all constitutional issues regarding the statute’s parallel scandalousness 
provision wide open for further debate—even within the Federal Circuit’s domain.24 
At first glance, there are two major policy implications underlying section 1052(a)’s 
statutory language that seem particularly troubling.  First, the provision serves as an inviting 
vehicle through which examining attorneys in the PTO may enforce their own subjective ideas of 
morality—a temptation that exists nowhere else within United States intellectual property law.25  
In short, the PTO possesses admirable expertise in several areas, but its employees do not possess 
the ability to effectively assess and measure the general public’s moral outrage.26  Imposing such 
an unreasonable duty on the PTO inevitably leads to individual examiners tapping into their own 
political views, religious backgrounds, geographic origins, and unique visceral reactions, thereby 
producing irreconcilably inconsistent results.27 
             The second troublesome policy implication regarding section 1052(a) is that its 
prohibitions are fundamentally inconsistent with the Lanham Act’s underlying purposes: to 
eliminate deceptive and misleading trademarks from interstate commerce; to protect registrants 
                                                          
24 Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330 n.1; see also Lawrence K. Nodine & Daniel B. Englander, In re Tam En Banc Decision—
Lanham Act 2(a) Is Unconstitutional, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP (Dec. 22, 2015), 
http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2015-12-22-in-re-tam-en-banc-decision-lanham-act-2-a-
is-unconstitutional.aspx (“Although the Court did not rule that . . . other aspects of the statute were also 
unconstitutional, it nonetheless made clear that it was open to further challenges to these provisions.”). 
25 See Phillips, supra note 9, at 56 (“It seems peculiar to call upon the United States Patent and Trademark Office to 
monitor and protect the morals of society; these sorts of police powers have historically been the domain of states and 
explicitly not the domain of the federal government.”).  The free market itself would likely be a more appropriate 
judge of a trademark’s value as a source indicator. Id.  No equivalent morality standard exists in American copyright 
or patent law; in fact, both of these regimes explicitly offer protection for controversial and potentially offensive 
works. Id. at 71.  For example, the United States Copyright Office lacks authority to deny copyright registration to a 
pornographic magazine, provided the magazine constitutes an “original work of authorship” fixed in a “tangible 
medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).  Additionally, the PTO demonstrated its lack of concern for morality 
as a criterion of patentability when it issued a patent for a “female functional” mannequin in 1995. Phillips, supra note 
9, at 71 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,466,235 (filed Mar. 27, 1995)).    
26 Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 
TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1477 (2011).   
27 Id. at 1476–77.  
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against unfair competition; and to prevent commercial fraud.28  Other sections and subsections of 
the Lanham Act more appropriately reflect these goals.29  However, the prohibition of scandalous 
and/or disparaging trademark registrations is entirely disconnected from these underlying 
concerns.  Offensive marks do not necessarily confuse consumers or stimulate unfair competition; 
they also have the potential to acquire goodwill and serve as effective source identifiers.30  In sum, 
the fundamental purposes underlying the Lanham Act strongly suggest that registration 
prohibitions should exist only to the extent necessary to reduce consumer confusion in the 
marketplace.31  
In light of the foregoing policy and the following legal analysis, this Comment posits that 
the Federal Circuit’s resolution of Tam was a step in the right direction, and the United States 
Supreme Court should affirm the decision if and when it grants certiorari.  Ultimately, however, 
both the scandalousness and disparagement prohibitions of section 1052(a) should be struck down 
as facially violative of the First Amendment.  As opposed to focusing on the facially viewpoint-
discriminatory nature of section 1052(a)’s prohibitions, this Comment attacks McGinley through 
its analysis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as that doctrine interacts with Congress’s 
Article I spending power.  As will be shown, section 1052(a) impermissibly abridges the First 
Amendment freedoms of trademark applicants through operation of the unconstitutional 
                                                          
28 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2015).  Subsequent case law has identified additional related purposes, including the following: 
to lessen consumer search costs; to ensure that manufacturers reap the goodwill and other reputation-related benefits 
of their investments; to identify and distinguish a seller’s goods from others; and to enable consumers to make 
decisions based on previous experiences with a particular product. Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 466 (citing 
Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (2004)); Robert Wright, Today’s 
Scandal Can Be Tomorrow’s Vogue: Why Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act Is Unconstitutionally Void for Vagueness, 
48 HOW. L.J. 659, 660 (2005). 
29 See, e.g., § 1052(d) (granting the PTO authority to deny registration for marks that strongly resemble other 
previously registered marks and marks that are otherwise likely to cause consumer confusion). 
30 LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 26, at 1487. 
31 See Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To Live in In-“Fame”-Y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as Analogous to Famous 
Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 180 (2007) (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:14 (4th ed. 2004)). 
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conditions doctrine.  Because McGinley failed to even consider this doctrine in its analysis, its 
ruling that section 1052(a) survives First Amendment scrutiny fails to suffice as viable precedent.32  
More importantly, the Spending Clause of the United States Constitution no longer justifies section 
1052(a)’s intrusive restrictions on speech—as the McGinley court held.  This latter point has little 
to do with the provision’s content- or viewpoint-discrimination, and the Federal Circuit need not 
have engaged in any complex First Amendment analysis in order to dismiss the government’s 
“permissible non-subsidy” argument.  Rather, drastic changes in the PTO’s internal management 
and budget mechanisms33 have rendered McGinley obsolete, and federal trademark registration 
proceedings no longer implicate public treasury funds to a constitutionally adequate degree.  In 
other words, even if section 1052(a)’s prohibitions were content-neutral, McGinley’s proposition 
that the Spending Clause grants Congress the power to withhold federal trademark registrations is 
incorrect, because the issuance of such a registration does not in any way constitute a government 
subsidy.  
             Part II of this Comment summarizes necessary background information regarding how 
section 1052(a) operates in practice.  Part III includes a brief description of the constitutional 
challenges that have been raised in litigation as prior attempts to invalidate the provision on its 
face.  Part IV argues that section 1052(a) imposes an unconstitutional condition which unlawfully 
abridges trademark applicants’ First Amendment rights.  Part V argues that section 1052(a)’s First 
Amendment intrusion is no longer justified by Congress’s inherent spending authority under 
                                                          
32 In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 580 (Fed. Cir.) (Moore, J., additional views), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 
F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
33 See id. (“[T]he act of registering a trademark does not involve the federal treasury.  In 1981, as noted by the 
McGinley court, trademark registration was ‘underwritten by public funds.’  That is no longer true today.  Since 1991, 
PTO operations have been funded entirely by registration fees, not the taxpayer.” (quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 
481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981)) (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 
(1990); Revision of Patent and Trademark Fees, 56 Fed. Reg. 65142-01 (Dec. 13, 1991) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 
pt. 1, 2))).  
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Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution.  Finally, Part VI states that as an abridgement of 
trademark applicants’ First Amendment rights to engage in offensive commercial speech, section 
1052(a) must withstand a form of intermediate scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York; the provision fails to survive such scrutiny and 
thus must be invalidated as unconstitutional. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF SECTION 1052(A) 
A. The Procedural Mechanisms Governing Section 1052(a) Rejections and 
Appeals 
 
             Either a group or individual may submit an application for federal trademark registration 
to the PTO.34  The application is then assigned to an examining attorney who confirms that the 
applicant has complied with all procedural formalities and determines whether the proposed mark 
overcomes all substantive statutory prohibitions.35  At this stage, the examiner can decide that the 
proposed mark consists of scandalous or disparaging material and refuse registration on those 
grounds.36  If this occurs, the denied applicant is given six months to amend his or her application, 
present evidence countering a finding of scandalousness or disparagement, or otherwise respond 
with legal arguments.37  Following a final office action, a rejected applicant may appeal to the 
TTAB.38  If the applicant is again denied trademark registration, he or she may submit another 
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.39  Via this route, a denial of 
registration could theoretically make its way to the United States Supreme Court.40   
                                                          
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2015). 
35 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § 704.01 (5th ed. Sept. 2007); Wright, supra note 28, at 667 (citing 
§ 1062(b)).  
36 See § 1052(a). 
37 See Wright, supra note 28, at 667–68. 
38 § 1070. 
39 See id. § 1071. 
40 Wright, supra note 28, at 669. 
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             By contrast, if the PTO examiner approves the application, the PTO publishes notice in 
The Trademark Official Gazette,41 and the public has thirty days to oppose the mark’s 
registration.42  If members of the public do not submit an opposition within thirty days, the PTO 
issues the applicant a certificate of registration.43  Once an applicant receives this certificate, all 
protections afforded by registration are effective.  A trademark owner who demonstrates five years 
of consistent post-registration commercial use acquires an “incontestable” right to continue using 
the mark in interstate commerce.44  This “incontestable” status is somewhat of a misnomer, 
however, because a third party who believes that he or she will be damaged by a trademark’s 
scandalous or disparaging qualities may still initiate a TTAB cancellation proceeding at any time 
following the mark’s registration.45   
B. The “Scandalousness” and “Disparagement” Tests 
             Although the literal language of section 1052(a) sets forth four separate prohibitions for 
“immoral,” “deceptive,” “scandalous,” and “disparaging” subject matter,46 the PTO and courts 
alike have lumped section 1052(a) challenges into two broadly inclusive categories: those asserting 
scandalousness and those asserting disparagement.   
             Courts have defined “scandalous” marks as marks consisting of subject matter that is 
“shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . 
giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or] calling out [for] condemnation.”47  
                                                          
41 37 C.F.R. § 2.80 (2006). 
42 Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 455 (2007). 
43 Id. at 454–55. 
44 § 1065. 
45 Smith, supra note 42, at 455. 
46 § 1052(a). 
47 In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 
327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938)).  Alternatively, the PTO can establish scandalousness by showing that a mark is “vulgar.” 
See In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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Whether a proposed trademark consists of scandalous subject matter is to be determined from the 
perspective of “not necessarily a majority, but a substantial composite of the general public.”48  
Courts make such a determination in the context of “contemporary attitudes.”49  Generally 
speaking, courts have grouped “scandalous” trademarks into eight distinct categories: (1) marks 
having religious significance;50 (2) marks consisting of problematic political imagery;51 (3) marks 
containing sexual innuendo and/or sexually graphic imagery;52 (4) marks containing profanity;53 
(5) marks implicating illegal substances or activities;54 (6) marks containing slang terminology;55 
(7) marks containing references to violence;56 and (8) marks implicating one’s sexual orientation.57 
                                                          
48 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981).  The Federal Circuit attached little significance to the PTO’s 
attempt at objectivity through implementation of the “substantial composite” standard.  Instead, the court noted that 
viewpoint discrimination is viewpoint discrimination regardless of whether the government itself disapproves of a 
given message or posits that some other part of the populace will disapprove of the message.  In re Tam, 808 F.3d 
1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 
505 U.S. 377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).    
49 Mavety Media, 33 F.3d at 1371 (citing In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993)). 
50 See, e.g., Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d 327 (barring the mark “MADONNA” from registration for wines because 
members of the Christian faith would likely find the association scandalous); see also In re Reemtsma 
Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (barring registration of the mark 
“SENUSSI” for cigarettes because the name represents a sect of Muslim culture in which tobacco is forbidden for 
religious reasons). 
51 See, e.g., Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 156 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1938) (barring registration 
of the mark “QUEEN MARY” for women’s undergarments); see also Old Glory Condom, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 
(overturning a PTO examiner’s final refusal to register a condom design featuring traditional American stars and 
stripes). 
52 See, e.g., McGinley, 660 F.2d 481 (barring registration of an image depicting a nude couple kissing and embracing); 
see also Ex parte Parfum L’orle, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 481 (P.T.O. 1952) (overturning a PTO examining 
attorney’s refusal to register the mark “LIBIDO” for perfume scents).  
53 See, e.g., In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (barring registration of the mark 
“BULLSHIT” for clothing).  But see In re Leo Quan, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 370 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (permitting 
registration of the mark “BADASS” for stringed instruments); see also In re Big Effin Garage, L.L.C., 2010 LEXIS 
418 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 23, 2010) (permitting registration of the mark “BIG EFFIN GARAGE” for online music 
communities). 
54 See, e.g., Office Action for U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,038,867 (Aug. 28, 2010) (barring registration 
of the mark “KO KANE” for alcoholic drinks because a substantial composite of the general public would likely 
interpret the mark as glamorizing drug abuse). 
55 See, e.g., In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (barring registration of the mark “BUBBY 
TRAP” for brassieres). 
56 See e.g., In re Love Bottling Co., 2005 LEXIS 261 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2005) (barring registration of the mark “WIFE 
BEATER” for male tank tops); Office Action for U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,400,213 (P.T.O. Nov. 18, 
2004) (barring registration of the mark “BABY Al QUAEDA” for t-shirts).  
57 See, e.g., Office Action for U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,281,746 (Feb. 28, 2004, revised Oct. 28, 
2004) (barring registration of the mark “DYKES ON BIKES” for the San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle 
Contingent), overruled by McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1212 (T.T.A.B. 2006).  
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             By contrast, a disparaging mark is one which “dishonors by comparison with what is 
inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or affects or injures by unjust comparison.”58  The TTAB 
articulated the seminal two-part test for disparagement in 1999.  First, the court or tribunal must 
consider dictionary evidence, the relationship of the proposed mark’s elements, and the relevant 
segment of the marketplace to determine the likely meaning of the proposed mark.59  Second, the 
court must determine whether a substantial composite of the relevant public will perceive that 
likely meaning as disparaging.60   
             The disparagement test can be distinguished from the scandalousness test in three 
significant ways.  First, “while a trademark must be scandalous to be denied, registration can be 
denied if a trademark may be disparaging.”61  In practice, this variation means that challengers 
asserting disparagement are required to satisfy a lesser burden of proof than challengers asserting 
scandalousness under identical circumstances.  Second, while there are certain situations in which 
a mark may be assessed for scandalousness using only dictionary evidence,62 the disparagement 
test necessarily requires a further examination of the relevant market segment as well as the 
allegedly disparaged group’s culture.63  Third, rather than depending on the perspective of a 
substantial composite of the general public, disparagement is “evaluated from the perspective of 
a substantial composite of the demographic on which the mark is commenting . . . .”64 
                                                          
58 In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
59 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999) 
60 Id. 
61 Smith, supra note 42, at 464.  
62 See In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that when “multiple dictionaries . 
. . uniformly indicate that a word is vulgar, and the applicant’s use of the word is clearly limited to the vulgar meaning 
of the word, . . . the PTO can sustain its burden of showing that the mark comprises or consists of scandalous matter 
by reference to dictionary definitions alone”). 
63 See Smith, supra note 42, at 464. 
64 Gibbons, supra note 3, at 212; see In re Heeb Media, L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (holding 
that the term, “heeb,” is a “highly disparaging reference to Jewish people, that it retains this meaning when used in 
connection with the applicant’s goods and services, and that a substantial composite of the referenced group finds it 
to be disparaging”). 
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             In making a section 1052(a) determination of scandalousness or disparagement, courts 
have relied on dictionary definitions, opinion surveys, marketing strategies, newspaper articles, 
Internet forums, blogs, and expert witness testimonies.65  Dictionary definitions are the most 
common form of evidence utilized in section 1052(a) proceedings,66 and there are some 
circumstances under which a PTO examining attorney can rely solely on dictionary definitions to 
reject an application.67  Opinion surveys, by contrast, are widely associated with consumption of 
time and excessive cost; as such, courts rarely utilize this form of evidence in scandalous 
determinations, where it is not required.68  
C. Third-Party Standing to Challenge a Registered Trademark  
The test for standing in the context of trademark cancellation proceedings is unusually 
generous to third parties.69  This is because the TTAB relies on third party challenges as a primary 
means of enforcing the section 1052(a) prohibitions.  Acknowledging the “somewhat vague” and 
“highly subjective” qualities of the section 1052(a) standards,70 the Board has vowed to resolve 
any doubts concerning a mark’s registrability in favor of the applicant.71  The general 
understanding is that if a significant segment of the public later finds the mark to be scandalous or 
disparaging, then a third party can institute an action, and the TTAB will have the opportunity to 
compile a more complete record. 
The customary requirements for standing under Article III of the Constitution were 
articulated nicely by the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:   
                                                          
65 See Lalonde & Gilson, supra note 26, at 1498–1507. 
66 See Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d at 1340 (“[D]ictionary definitions represent an effort to distill the collective 
understanding of the community with respect to language and thus clearly constitute more than a reflection of the 
individual views of either the examining attorney or the dictionary editors.”). 
67 See supra note 62. 
68 Smith, supra note 42, at 461. 
69 Id. at 456. 
70 In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470 (T.T.A.B. 1988). 
71 In re Over Our Heads, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990). 
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Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.  First, 
the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of 
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; 
and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”  
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . 
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . 
the[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not 
before the court.”  Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely 
“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable 
decision.”72  
Notwithstanding these ordinary Article III requirements, the Lanham Act does not deem it 
necessary for the party asserting a section 1052(a) challenge to have a “specific commercial 
interest . . . not shared by the general public.”73   Rather, pursuant to the statute, any party who 
believes he or she is (or would be) “damaged” by the trademark at issue may file a formal 
opposition with the PTO prior to the mark’s registration or a formal petition for cancellation 
with the TTAB at any time following the mark’s registration.74  A challenger may satisfy this 
lenient standard by showing that he possesses a particular characteristic that the allegedly 
scandalous or disparaging mark directly implicates, or by showing that other members of the 
general public share his belief in emotional or psychological harm.75  
             As one can imagine, the Act’s generous standing requirement can and has become 
problematic in practice.  This is because the Act “effectively allows small special interest groups 
to curtail others’ speech, raising the risk that trademarks are governed by political correctness 
                                                          
72 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 
(1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 at 38, 41–43 
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41, n.16 (1972)). 
73 Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
74 15 U.S.C. § 1063–64 (2015). 
75 LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 26, at 1508. 
14 
 
rather than free speech values.”76  Note that a third party may not only preclude a trademark 
owner from achieving federal registration in the first instance, but may also institute a 
cancellation proceeding at any time following a successful registration.  Thus, a trademark owner 
is never totally safe from the risk that his intellectual property rights will be swept out from 
underneath his feet by a third party asserting scandalousness or disparagement.  After years of 
bolstering a product’s reputation and investing in goodwill, the possibility remains that an owner 
will have to re-litigate his mark’s moral wholesomeness at the risk of losing his registration.77  In 
this situation, the owner would be forced to create a new mark and spend sizeable sums 
informing the public of the association between his new mark and his old product.78  Thus, the 
specter of a looming third party challenger significantly deters the adoption of potentially 
offensive trademarks, and the Lanham Act’s generous standing requirements significantly 
contribute to section 1052(a)’s net “chilling effect” on speech. 
III. PRIOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECTION 1052(A) 
A. First Amendment Challenges 
             In 1981, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)79 boldly 
announced the following: “[I]t is clear that the PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark does not 
affect his right to use it.  No conduct is prescribed, and no tangible form of expression is 
suppressed.  Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would not be abridged by the 
                                                          
76 Smith, supra note 42, at 456.  For example, one scholar observes that under the standard announced in Ritchie, an 
ultra-conservative Christian group may have standing to challenge the validity of federal protections granted to a pro-
gay rights trademark. Id.   
77 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
78 Id. 
79 The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was the predecessor to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit. See History of the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_cpa.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).  It was abolished in 
1982, one year after McGinley was decided. See id. 
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refusal to register the mark.”80  During the thirty-plus years between McGinley and the recent grant 
of a rehearing en banc in In re Tam, the Federal Circuit has unwaveringly continued to reiterate 
McGinley’s reasoning in dismissing First Amendment challenges to section 1052(a)’s facial 
validity.81  Nonetheless, trademark applicants have continued to challenge the statute on First 
Amendment grounds.  It has been said that the provision’s constitutional basis is “crumbling,”82 
and the Federal Circuit’s December 2015 ruling invalidating section 1052(a)’s disparagement 
provision adds dramatic support to this notion. 
B. Fifth Amendment Void-for-Vagueness Challenges  
             The origins of the void-for-vagueness doctrine lie in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.83  In simplest terms, the doctrine requires a certain level of specificity in statutory 
language.84  A statute is unconstitutionally vague if: (1) it fails to provide the general public with 
fair notice of what conduct is affected by the law; and (2) it has the potential to “impermissibly 
delegate” policymaking duties to judicial officials, with the “attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application.”85  When a vague statute regulates or burdens expression in a content-
discriminatory manner, the statute raises special concerns due to its chilling effect on the freedom 
of speech,86 and the Supreme Court has held that a more stringent vagueness test applies under 
these circumstances.87  As such, when a regulation of expression is at issue, the Court examines 
                                                          
80 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
81 See, e.g., In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
82 Phillips, supra note 9, at 66; see Lee, supra note 9, at 67 (“An ‘abridgement’ may result from regulations that do 
not ‘ban,’ ‘forbid,’ or ‘prohibit.’  In fact, an ‘abridgement’ may result from regulations that merely ‘restrict,’ ‘impinge,’ 
or burden.” (quoting Baird, supra note 9, at 669)); Smith, supra note 42, at 468 (“[I]t is understood that a speaker 
cannot be prevented from speaking in a public park just because she can go home and say the same speech privately.”).      
83 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
84 Wright, supra note 28, at 661. 
85 Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972). 
86 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997). 
87 Vill. Of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). 
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the regulatory language with increased scrutiny to ensure that statutory ambiguities do not deter 
protected speech.88  Trademark applicants and legal scholars have attacked section 1052(a) as 
unconstitutionally vague on numerous grounds. 
1. Shifting Paradigms 
             First, litigants and scholars have argued that society’s idea of what is acceptable is subject 
to change over time.  Therefore, that which a substantial composite of society considers 
“scandalous” or “disparaging” is at best a moving target.89  In this context, it is informative to 
recall how the homosexual community was viewed in 2003:  
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in 
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters 
for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as 
boarders in their home.  They view this as protecting themselves and 
their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and 
destructive.90 
 
While both the TTAB and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have acknowledged that they must 
consider ever-changing attitudes and paradigms while ruling on a trademark’s registrability, the 
TTAB has also declared that “the fact that profane words may be uttered more freely does not 
render them any the less profane.”91  This reasoning essentially enables the TTAB and the PTO to 
ignore contemporary attitudes if and when they choose to do so. 
2. Blurring of Statutory Definitions 
                                                          
88 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–18 (2012). 
89 Phillips, supra note 9, at 70.  
90 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
91 In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981). 
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             Second, applicants who are denied trademark registration claim that the PTO’s frequent 
practice of collapsing the scandalousness and disparagement analyses into a single amorphous 
framework lends further ambiguity to statutory terms that are already imprecise.92 
3. Unreliability of Dictionary Evidence 
             Next, litigants attack the perceived ineffectiveness of dictionaries as evidence to show 
scandalousness or likely disparagement.  Applicants assert that the appropriate focus of a section 
1052(a) inquiry is not necessarily a phrase’s literal meaning, but rather the way in which a 
substantial composite of the relevant group perceives that phrase.93  Simply put, dictionary 
definitions are ill-suited for this task.94  Additionally, dictionary definitions—like social 
paradigms—are subject to change as time passes.95  Many PTO examining attorneys have 
attempted to remedy this deficiency by consulting online dictionaries, which may lack sufficient 
indicia of authoritativeness and reliability.96 
4. Lack of Clarity in Substantial Composite Standard 
             Litigants and scholars have also argued that there exists a lack of clarity within the Federal 
Circuit’s “substantial composite” standard.  The Federal Circuit itself has acknowledged the 
“inherent difficulty in fashioning a single objective measure like a substantial composite of the 
general public from the myriad of subjective viewpoints.”97  To further aggravate the ambiguity, 
neither case law nor legislative history has supplied any explanation for how an examining attorney 
or a fact-finding tribunal is to define a “substantial composite.”98  One commentator has posited 
                                                          
92 See Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 471; e.g., In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 
1993) (“[O]ur finding . . . that the mark is not scandalous subsumes a finding that the mark is not disparaging.”). 
93 Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 469. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 480–81; see Gibbons, supra note 3, at 208 (“Some dictionaries are slower in recognizing new meanings given 
to existing words by disenfranchised groups.”). 
96 Gibbons, supra note 3, at 208–09. 
97 In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
98 See Smith, supra note 42, at 461. 
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that the term is a “vacuous point on a nebulous continuum . . . chosen post-hoc to justify the 
decision-maker’s preconceived determination.”99  To make matters worse, the standard has not 
always been universally articulated or applied.100 
5. Relevance of the Proposed Mark’s Surrounding Context 
             Another inconsistency deals with the relevance of a proposed mark’s surrounding context.  
Applicants complain that they are unsure of whether or not the PTO will consider such context 
when making a section 1052(a) determination.  In this regard, two contradictory lines of precedent 
have developed.  First, the McGinley line of cases examines a proposed trademark in the context 
of the underlying goods or services it serves to distinguish.101  A conflicting line of cases embodies 
the per se inquiry, focusing its section 1052(a) inquiries solely on the proposed trademark itself, 
as that mark exists independently from the nature of the underlying goods or services.102  
Examining bodies frequently move back and forth between the two conflicting approaches—a 
“schizophrenic movement” that leads to greater unpredictability and further administrative 
inconsistency.103 
6. Relevance of Applicant’s Intent 
                                                          
99 Gibbons, supra note 3, at 248 n.89. 
100 See, e.g., In re Hepperle, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 512 (T.T.A.B. 1972) (applying an “average purchaser” standard). 
101 See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 482, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (barring registration of a sexual image partly 
because the mark indicated that the underlying services involved “illicit sexual intercourse”); In re Old Glory Condom 
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.1d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (permitting registration of a condom design incorporating elements of the 
American flag partly because the applicant’s stated intent was to raise AIDS awareness by suggesting a national duty 
to promote HIV protection); In re Leo Quan, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 370 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (permitting registration 
of the mark, “BADASS,” because the mark had an alternative non-vulgar meaning, serving as an acronym for 
“Bettencourt Acoustically Designed Audio Sound Systems”). 
102 Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter Under Section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act: Can One Man’s Vulgarity Be Another’s Registered Trademark?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 345 (1993); see, 
e.g., In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981). 
103 Abdel-Khalik, supra note 31, at 211.  Compare In re Red Bull G.M.B.H., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1375 (T.T.A.B. 2006) 
(“It is clearly the profane connotation of the term per se, rather than a particular meaning of the term when considered 
in connection with goods . . . .”), with Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 227 (P.T.O. 
1951) (“A trade mark does not exist apart from goods in connection with which it is used . . . .”). 
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             Trademark applicants have argued that the ambiguous role of intent serves as yet another 
basis for a vagueness challenge to the constitutional validity of section 1052(a).  Simply put, 
sometimes the TTAB considers the applicant’s intent in creating and/or utilizing a mark in 
commerce; other times, the TTAB expressly declines to do so.104 
7. The Non-Role of Precedent in Section 1052(a) Determinations 
             The doctrine of stare decisis—often somewhat of a natural cure for underlying statutory 
vagueness concerns—is entirely lacking in the context of section 1052(a) scandalousness and 
disparagement determinations; rather, the PTO and the TTAB are free to rule on these issues on a 
case-by-case basis, without using any prior decisions, patterns, or trends as a form of guidance or 
direction:   
It is well settled that the Board must decide each application on its 
own merits, and decisions regarding other registrations do not bind 
either examining attorneys or this Board.  The fact that, whether 
because of administrative error or otherwise, some marks have been 
registered even though they may be in violation of the governing 
statutory standard does not mean that the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office must forgo applying that standard in all other cases.105 
 
Without prior registrations and rejections having some precedential force, trademark applicants 
have complained that they have no choice but to guess as to whether their potentially scandalous 
and/or disparaging marks will achieve the protections of federal registration.106 
                                                          
104 Compare In re Heeb Media, L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (“The fact that an applicant has good 
intentions with its use of the term does not obviate the fact that a substantial composite of the referenced group find 
the term objectionable. . . .  Our focus must be on the perception of the referenced groups and not the applicant’s 
intentions.”), with Old Glory Condom, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (permitting registration of a condom design featuring 
traditional stars and stripes typically associated with the American flag largely because the applicant’s intention was 
not to offend or disparage, but to redefine patriotism in a way that prioritizes the fight against AIDS and other STD’s). 
105 In re RK Netmedia, Inc., No. 77064737, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 389 (T.T.A.B. May 21, 2009). 
106 LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 26, at 1506.  For perhaps the most egregious example of the arbitrariness that results 
from the lack of stare decisis in this context, see In re Watkins, No. 76138675, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 651 (T.T.A.B. 
Feb. 8, 2005) (overturning the PTO’s refusal to register the mark “TWATTY GIRL” following successful applications 
and registrations of “TWATTY” and “TWATTYTRAX” by the same applicant).   
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8. Inconsistent Results 
             Finally, trademark applicants and scholars argue that the vagueness and arbitrariness of 
section 1052(a) is best illustrated through the statute’s inconsistent (and often humorous) results.  
For instance, as of 2011, the PTO had received forty-one applications containing the term, 
“MILF.”107  Twenty were rejected; twenty were not; the remaining application was abandoned.108  
“It was a tie.”109  Perhaps Megan M. Carpenter and Kathryn T. Murphy best expressed trademark 
applicants’ frustration with these inconsistent results:  
When BULLSHIT for handbags will scandalize the public, 
but BIG PECKER for T-shirts will not; when CLEARLY QUEER 
for clothing will register, but QUEER GEAR, also for clothing, will 
not; when TWATTY GIRL for cartoon strips is rejected, but 
TWATTY for cartoon strips is not, it is time to reexamine the 
structure and implementation of the section 2(a) bars.110 
 
            The foregoing illustrates that section 1052(a) and its case law grant tremendously 
unfettered discretion to a small number of PTO attorneys.111  The exercise of that discretion is 
entirely arbitrary, often depending largely upon examining attorneys’ unique personal reactions to 
crude subject matter.112  The resulting lack of clarity is unfair to trademark applicants, who have 
no fair notice of whether their proposed marks will ultimately achieve registration.113  More 
importantly, the immense uncertainty surrounding section 1052(a) provides disincentives that 
contribute significantly to the provision’s chilling effect on speech.  Nonetheless, courts and 
examining bodies have continued to blindly reiterate McGinley’s holding that section 1052(a) is 
                                                          
107 LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 26, at 1478. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1481. 
110 Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 482. 
111 See Smith, supra note 4242, at 481. 
112 See Phillips, supra note 9, at 60–61. 
113 Wright, supra note 28, at 678. 
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“sufficiently precise to enable the PTO and the courts to apply the law fairly and to notify a would-
be registrant that the mark he adopts will not be granted a federal registration.”114 
IV. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
A. Introduction to the Doctrine 
 The first reason that the Federal Circuit was correct in partially overruling McGinley is that 
McGinley upheld section 1052(a) against First Amendment challenge without considering the 
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.  In its simplest terms, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine is a judicially developed rule that prohibits the federal government from conditioning the 
receipt of a benefit upon an individual’s waiver of a constitutionally protected right.115  In other 
words, Congress may not withhold a benefit solely because the individual who would otherwise 
receive the benefit exercised his First Amendment right to free speech.116  In 1972, Justice 
Stewart—writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in Perry v. Sindermann—set forth an 
especially clear articulation of the rule:   
[E]ven though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental 
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit 
for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the 
government may not rely.  It may not deny a benefit to a person on 
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—
especially, his interest in freedom of speech.  For if the government 
could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally 
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms 
would in effect be penalized and inhibited.117 
 
             In Perry, Plaintiff Robert Sindermann was employed as a professor at a state college for 
ten years.118  Following his election as President of the Texas Junior College Teachers’ 
                                                          
114 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
115 See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 577 (Fed. Cir.) (Moore, J., additional views), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 
600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
116 Id. 
117 Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
118 Id. at 593. 
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Association, Mr. Sindermann publicly advocated the elevation of his employer from a two-year 
college to a four-year college—a position opposed by the school’s Board of Regents.119  Mr.  
Sindermann alleged that as a result of his choice to publicly voice these opinions and other 
criticisms of the school district, the Board of Regents refused to offer him a new employment 
contract for the following academic year.120  The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case for 
further fact-finding, but held that the district’s refusal to renew a public contract on these grounds 
alone would constitute a violation of Mr. Sindermann’s First Amendment rights through operation 
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.121 
              Prior to Perry, the Supreme Court elaborated on its unconstitutional condition 
jurisprudence on one other occasion: Speiser v. Randall.122  In Speiser, a group of honorably 
discharged World War II veterans claimed a veterans’ property tax exemption provided by 
California’s state constitution.123  Pursuant to California law, in order to qualify for the tax 
exemption, the veterans were required to sign an oath stating that they did not advocate the 
overthrow of the United States government, and that they would not support a foreign government 
in the event of an international conflict with the United States.124  In holding that the provision 
violated the veterans’ First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court stated the following:   
It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption 
for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech. . . .  To deny 
an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is 
in effect to penalize them for such speech.  Its deterrent effect is the 
same as if the State were to fine them for this speech. . . .  Congress 
may not by withdrawal of privileges place limitations upon the 
freedom of speech which if directly attempted would be 
                                                          
119 Id. at 594–95. 
120 Id. at 595. 
121 Id. at 598. 
122 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
123 Id. at 514─15. 





In short, the Court held that the California state government’s denial of a tax exemption necessarily 
took on coercive characteristics, penalizing claimants for engaging in certain proscribed speech 
and thereby indirectly suppressing “dangerous ideas.”126  Importantly, this excerpted passage from 
the Court’s holding emphasizes a key rationale underlying the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine—that the government may not circumvent an individual’s constitutional rights by 
achieving indirectly what it is forbidden from achieving in a more direct and forthright manner. 
B. Section 1052(a) Imposes an Unconstitutional Condition 
             In Perry, a school district improperly conditioned the renewal of a public employment 
contract upon a teacher’s waiver of his First Amendment right to advocate a political position.127  
In Speiser, a state government similarly conditioned a tax exemption upon a veteran’s waiver of 
his First Amendment right to advocate the overthrow of the federal government.128  By way of 
analogy, section 1052(a) conditions the benefits of federal trademark registration upon an 
applicant’s surrender of his First Amendment right to engage in offensive speech.129 
             As a preliminary matter, the benefits of federal trademark registration are numerous, and 
they provide trademark owners with indispensable advantages in litigation.  First, upon 
registration, the PTO publishes constructive notice of trademark ownership in The Trademark 
Official Gazette, as well as in several other internationally distributed materials.130  Next, section 
1057 of the Lanham Act provides that a certificate of federal registration constitutes prima facie 
                                                          
125 Id. at 518. 
126 See id. at 519 (quoting American Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 492 (1950)). 
127 See supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 122–126 and accompanying text.  
129 Phillips, supra note 9, at 67–68. 
130 See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2015); Kristin D. Stout, Terrifying Trademarks and a Scandalous Disregard for the First 
Amendment: Section 2(a)’s Unconstitutional Prohibition on Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Trademarks, 25 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 213, 218 (2015). 
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evidence of trademark ownership and validity.131  This same provision provides federal trademark 
registrants with a nationwide right of priority in cancellation proceedings, as well as an exclusive 
right to commercial use of the registered mark in connection with the specified goods or 
services.132  Moreover, a separate provision of the Lanham Act provides that a registrant’s right to 
use his or her mark in commerce becomes incontestable after five consecutive years of post-
registration use.133  Finally, federal registrants are granted the right to enlist the aid of United States 
Customs in barring the importation of allegedly infringing goods,134 as well as the right to sue in 
federal courts to enforce their trademark rights upon a discovery of infringing activities.135   
             While section 1052(a) does not explicitly prohibit offensive commercial speech from 
entering the marketplace, its removal of the foregoing benefits evinces a congressional intent to 
discourage such speech, thereby creating a chilling effect that threatens to deprive trademark 
applicants of essential business protections.136  In other words, McGinley correctly asserts that a 
section 1052(a) denial would not prevent Mr. Tam from continuing to refer to his musical act as 
“The Slants” in commerce; however, such a denial severely burdens this commercial use by 
withholding rights that are essential in the entertainment industry, thereby placing Mr. Tam and 
his fellow band members at a significant competitive disadvantage.137  Pursuant to Perry and 
Speiser, it is irrelevant that Mr. Tam has no constitutional right to federal trademark registration, 
                                                          
131 § 1057. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. § 1065. 
134 See id. § 1124. 
135 See id. § 1121. 
136 Phillips, supra note 9, at 67–68. 
137 See In re Tam, 787 F.3d 567, 577 (Fed. Cir.) (Moore, J., additional views), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 
600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Baird, supra note 9, at 677 (“Although it is clear that barring and removing 
offensive matter from the federal registers will not proscribe the commercial use of such matter, it certainly provides 
an economic disincentive to engage in such use.”); Stout, supra note 130, at 216 (“To have an unprotected mark, one 
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and it is equally irrelevant that the lack of such protection does not prevent him from nevertheless 
using the speech at issue.  As discussed supra, these cases teach us that the purpose of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to prevent the federal government from achieving indirectly 
what it is prohibited from accomplishing directly.138  Because the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from directly banning offensive commercial speech,139 it is equally impermissible for 
Congress to achieve an identical result by prohibiting registration of “The Slants” under section 
1052(a).140 
Of course, there is an argument that the government’s actions in Perry and Speiser are 
distinguishable from section 1052(a)’s prohibitions, because the former constituted absolute bars 
on the plaintiffs’ expressive activities.  By contrast, section 1052(a) refusals extend only as far as 
the government’s corresponding grant of exclusivity in a particular mark.  In other words, the 
section 1052(a) prohibitions are connected to the government’s grant of a monopoly in a way that 
the restrictions at issue in Perry and Speiser were not related to the renewal of an employment 
contract or the grant of a tax exemption, respectively.  This argument implicates the perennial 
distinction between a permissible non-subsidy and an impermissible penalty.   
             The argument proceeds as follows.  Through section 1052(a), Congress and the PTO are 
effectively saying, “We will give you a benefit, but you can’t use that benefit to speak in a 
scandalous or disparaging manner.”  In Perry and Speiser, by contrast, the government is saying, 
“We will grant you a benefit, provided that you refrain from engaging in certain specified speech 
altogether.”  A simplified hypothetical example best illustrates the crucial difference.  If the 
                                                          
138 See Lee, supra note 9, at 68 (quoting Baird, supra note 9, at 693). 
139 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (“The First 
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from 
unwarranted governmental regulation.” (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
761–62 (1976))). 
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government were to hand an individual one hundred dollars, yet prohibit the individual from using 
that one hundred dollars to engage in political advocacy, this act would constitute a permissible 
non-subsidy.141  However, if the government were to offer the same individual one hundred dollars, 
while conditioning its receipt on the individual’s agreement to refrain from political speech 
entirely, this would constitute an unlawful, improperly coercive government action.142  The former 
situation represents a permissible use of the government’s spending powers, but the latter scenario 
imposes an unconstitutional condition.143  Some would argue that section 1052(a) is more closely 
analogous to the former situation, while Perry and Speiser are best understood as representative 
of the latter.   
             The foregoing effort to distinguish section 1052(a) from Perry and Speiser is without 
merit.  A proper analysis must assess: (1) the enormous competitive disadvantages a trademark 
applicant faces when his federal registration is rejected; and (2) the economic senselessness of 
foregoing the benefits that coincide with such registration.  When considered in light of these 
practical realities, countless prospective trademark registrants have in fact been entirely precluded 
not only from registering “offensive” trademarks, but also from adopting them in the first place. 
Together, these factors illustrate the broad “chilling effect” that section 1052(a) has on scandalous 
and disparaging speech generally.   
Keeping the foregoing economic realities in mind, section 1052(a) functions practically as 
an absolute bar against offensive commercial speech.  No sensible businessman would invest time, 
money, and other resources in developing a certain mark if he knew beforehand that he would be 
unable to assert nationwide priority rights in that particular mark.  Nor would he preemptively 
                                                          





sacrifice the ability to rely on advantageous presumptions in litigation.  The owner would simply 
select a different mark.  To act otherwise would be to forfeit rights in all geographic areas in which 
he is not actually using the mark, and to allow competitors to usurp his goodwill.  In short, such a 
sacrifice in today’s world would be economic suicide.  The only realistically viable response to 
section 1052(a)’s existence, therefore, is for trademark owners to discontinue use of offensive 
marks prior to any substantial investment in goodwill.144  Importantly, this immense 
discouragement extends beyond the federal government’s grant of a “monopoly,” and it permeates 
the commercial marketplace itself.  Not only is this broad eradication of offensive commercial 
speech the practical effect of section 1052(a), but it is also the only conceivable congressional 
intent underlying the provision.              
Furthermore, it is not necessarily appropriate to characterize the restrictions at issue in 
Perry and Speiser as absolute bars, yet the Supreme Court nevertheless found that the restrictions 
imposed unconstitutional conditions.  Nothing in the school district’s refusal to renew an 
employment contract precluded the plaintiff in Perry from continuing to advocate his political 
views while seeking employment in another jurisdiction.  Similarly, nothing prohibited the 
plaintiffs in Speiser from continuing to advocate the overthrow of the federal government while 
seeking to qualify for a different tax exemption.  In a sense, the availability of alternatives in Perry 
and Speiser makes the government actions in those cases less susceptible to a traditional 
“unconstitutional condition” challenge than a section 1052(a) refusal.  When facing a section 
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1052(a) rejection, by contrast, a trademark applicant has no available alternatives.  The certificate 
of federal registration is a unique right offered solely by the PTO, and the deprivation of its benefits 
essentially forces sensible businessmen to completely forego use of their proposed marks in 
commerce. 
V. SECTION 1052(A)’S FIRST AMENDMENT INTRUSION IS NO LONGER 
JUSTIFIED BY CONGRESS’S SPENDING POWER. 
 
A. Congress’s Spending Power 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (“the Taxing and Spending Clause”) grants Congress broad 
discretion to tax the public and spend public funds to promote the general welfare.145  This means 
that when the federal government appropriates funds from the public treasury to initiate a program, 
the Spending Clause grants Congress the authority to establish and define the limits of that 
recipient program.146  In other words, Congress may insist that funds from the federal treasury are 
spent in the congressionally authorized manner and for the congressionally authorized purposes 
specified in the grant at issue.147  This power occasionally includes the authority to impose 
conditions that affect recipients’ constitutional rights.148  Thus, there exists an inherent tension 
between applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and protecting Congress’s ability to 
direct government spending.149 
             Pursuant to its Spending Clause authority, Congress may condition the receipt of federal 
funds upon the satisfaction of objectives that are not included within its Article I, Section 8 
                                                          
145 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
146 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 196 (2003) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 
(1991)). 
147 In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 578 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 
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enumerated powers.150  Congress may also be selective with regard to what it considers to promote 
the general welfare; in other words, Congress may selectively fund certain activities if it feels that 
those activities are in the public’s best interest, but may decline to subsidize other programs that 
propose alternative solutions to the same problem.151  In doing so, Congress does not necessarily 
engage in unlawful viewpoint discrimination; rather, it simply chooses to “fund one activity to the 
exclusion of another.”152  Typically, if a recipient objects to a condition placed upon the receipt of 
federal funds, the sole remedy is to decline the funds and seek financial support elsewhere.153  This 
remains the case even when a recipient’s objection is that the condition imposed violates his 
constitutional rights to free speech.154 
B. Limitations on Congress’s Spending Power 
While Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause is very broad, there do exist some 
checks, balances, and limitations on that power.  For instance, Congress is required to exercise its 
spending authority only in pursuit of the general welfare.155  Additionally, Congress may not use 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds as leverage in regulating speech that is unrelated to the 
program at issue.156  Congress is also prohibited from encouraging states or private individuals 
themselves to violate the Constitution.157  None of these foregoing limitations appear problematic 
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factors” apply to Congress’s provision of financial incentives to individuals (as opposed to state governments), the 
Court has implicitly considered substantially similar factors under these circumstances.  See, e.g., Butler, 297 U.S. 1. 
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Ct. at 2328), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
157 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. 
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with regard to the Lanham Act’s scandalousness and disparagement prohibitions.  But there are 
two further restrictions on Congress’s spending power that do become relevant in assessing section 
1052(a)’s constitutionality: (1) the requirement that Congress exercise its spending powers only 
with respect to funds that otherwise belong to the public treasury;158 and (2) the requirement that 
Congress refrain from unduly “coercing” recipients to behave in a certain way.159   
C. Trademark Application Fees Are Private Expenditures Unconnected to the 
Public Treasury. 
 
             First, there is the most blatant and egregious way in which section 1052(a) exceeds 
Congress’s constitutional spending authority.  Due to drastic changes in the PTO’s budget 
mechanisms since McGinley was decided, federal trademark registration proceedings no longer 
implicate public treasury funds.  At the time McGinley was decided, trademark registrations were 
funded primarily by federal tax dollars,160 and the case was necessarily decided against this 
background.  As such, Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause at least arguably justified 
the resulting intrusions upon applicants’ First Amendment rights.161  Since Congress’s enactment 
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1991, however, trademark registrations have been 
funded entirely through individual user fees paid by the applicants themselves.162  As one judge 
has stated, “Unlike tangible property, a subsidy, or a tax exemption, bestowal of trademark 
registration does not result in a direct loss to any property or money from the public fisc.”163  
Therefore, the Spending Clause justification no longer has merit.  Perhaps the significance of this 
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change in the PTO’s financial structure is best illustrated through two federal cases that elaborate 
on the “public treasury” limitation: Rust v. Sullivan164 and Department of Texas, Veterans of 
Foreign Wars of the United States v. Texas Lottery Commission.165   
             In Rust v. Sullivan, the Department of Human Services promulgated regulations 
prohibiting Title X federal fund recipients from engaging in any abortion-related activities, 
including counseling and referral services.166  Recipient healthcare providers challenged the 
constitutionality of the regulations, alleging that Title X conditioned the receipt of federal funds 
upon the relinquishment of First Amendment rights—a violation of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.167  The United States Supreme Court held that the regulations did not abridge the 
recipients’ First Amendment rights.168  Rather, this was a permissible non-subsidy—a perfect 
example of Congress choosing to “fund one activity to the exclusion of another,” while 
simultaneously ensuring that the funds it provided were not used for purposes outside the scope of 
the federal program.169  An important factor in the Court’s opinion was that Title X subsidies were 
moneys obtained directly from the public fisc.170 
             More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the 
opposite result in Texas Lottery Commission.  In this case, the governmental regulation of speech 
at issue was promulgated by the state government of Texas, not by the federal government.  
However, the Fifth Circuit found that the Texas state government’s spending power—as set forth 
in the Texas state constitution and authoritatively construed in case law—was sufficiently 
analogous to the federal government’s spending powers to warrant judicial review in accordance 
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with an Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 analytical framework.171  The case dealt with a 1980 
amendment to the Texas state constitution which exempted qualified charitable organizations from 
state gambling prohibitions, provided that the organizations refrained from using any net gambling 
proceeds to engage in political advocacy.172  A group of affected charities brought suit against the 
state’s lottery commission, alleging abridgement of their First Amendment rights.173  The Fifth 
Circuit ruled that the regulatory regime in question granted a license, which is separate and distinct 
from any form of government subsidy.174  The charities received no funds from the public fisc, 
and therefore the restrictions on speech were subject to unrestricted analysis under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.175  The court distinguished the licenses in question from tax 
exemptions, which constitute a form of government subsidy administered by the tax system.176  
Here, however, no public monies were involved, and the only government “grant” involved was 
the grant of authority to conduct an activity that would otherwise be illegal177—essentially a form 
of protection against criminal prosecution and/or civil lawsuit. 
             Section 1052(a) is analogous to the provisions of the Texas state constitution at issue in 
Texas Lottery Commission because a certificate of federal trademark registration costs the federal 
government next to nothing.178  As a form of protection from trademark infringement and unfair 
competition, the certificate essentially functions like an occupational license, rather than as a 
government subsidy.  The lack of federal funds also distinguishes a section 1052(a) denial from 
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the Title X regulations at issue in Rust v. Sullivan, which simply specified how federal funds were 
to be used if and when granted to a recipient program.179  Here, no such funds are granted to a 
trademark applicant seeking Lanham Act registration, so similar specifications are unwarranted.  
To drive the point home, numerous judges and commentators have observed that more government 
resources are expended during the appeals processes following section 1052(a) rejections than 
could ever be spent on their approvals.180      
             Although trademark registrations are fully funded by privatized applicant fees, it remains 
the case that some public funds are inevitably spent on facilitating the examining process and 
otherwise enforcing a litigant’s subsequently acquired intellectual property rights.181  Examples of 
these expenditures include public employee salaries, pensions, health insurance, other benefits, 
and court costs.182  However, this routine dip into the public treasury is too attenuated from Lanham 
Act benefits to justify section 1052(a)’s First Amendment intrusion under Congress’s spending 
powers.183  A holding otherwise would implicate the Spending Clause with regard to every 
conceivable benefit provided by a government entity, transforming the coercive denial of those 
benefits into permissible non-subsidies.   
For instance, if the government’s act of registering a trademark qualified as a subsidy, then 
it would likewise be reasonable to argue that the government subsidizes the author of a book or 
the writer of an article when it grants him or her a copyright.184  The government could then 
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circumvent the prohibitions of the First Amendment and ban the copyright registration of literary 
works tending to offend scattered segments of the general public.  If Congress had decided to deny 
the benefits and protections of copyright registration to any literary work that contains scandalous 
and/or disparaging material, the world may have been deprived of such great works as Mark 
Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, J.D. Salinger’s A Catcher in the Rye, and D. H. 
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterly’s Lover.  Similarly, pursuant to the line of reasoning advocated by the 
government in Tam, the government could also use its inherent spending powers and “non-
subsidy” decisions to regulate the content displayed during parades or peaceful protests.   After 
all, most parades take place on public property and require licenses or permits.  The offices that 
issue these licenses or permits are run by public employees who need to be paid, and public tax 
dollars ultimately fund these salaries and benefits.   
Obviously, the government’s argument becomes absurd when taken to these extremes.  
That is because the costs the government incurs in registering trademarks are the same incidental 
costs that inevitably accompany any system of governmental registration, e.g., copyrights, patents, 
property deeds, etc.185  In deciding whether any tension exists between the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine and Congress’s inherent spending power, courts only consider whether the 
conditioned benefits are paid for with public treasury funds, not whether the programs at issue are 
subsidized in more routine, indirect manners.186 
One of the reasons the Spending Clause reaches farther and more broadly than the 
Commerce Clause is because of its “built-in” limitations.187  Congress needs to spend money in 
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order to trigger its spending power, and that money is by no means limitless.188  With section 
1052(a), however, Congress is essentially invoking its spending power while granting costless 
benefits.  The potentially limitless nature of trademark registration certificates provides the 
government with infinite temptation to “subsidize” or “non-subsidize,” all while selectively 
infringing upon essential First Amendment freedoms. 
An opposing argument exists in the notion that the monies comprising PTO user fees 
become funds within the public treasury’s possession once they are paid.  But this argument fails 
to recognize the traditional distinction between a public “tax” and a private “fee.”  The underlying 
policy of a taxation system is that citizens who benefit from the existence of a government should 
generally pay their fair shares to maintain that government.189  Importantly, there is little to no 
connection between a taxpayer and the entity that decides how to spend the collected revenue.190  
A tax ultimately provides the treasury with public funds that may be properly allocated to any 
lawful governmental purpose, and there is no guarantee that those funds will directly benefit the 
payer.191  By contrast, a governmental entity collects a “commodity charge” or a “user fee” in 
exchange for specific products or services rendered to consumers.192  In this latter situation, 
specific protections ensure that the fee’s proceeds are used exclusively to finance the provision of 
the goods or services in the transaction at hand, and the sums are not used for general governmental 
purposes.193 
             Although public funds do not necessarily have to satisfy the technical definition of a tax 
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to constitute “funds within the public treasury’s possession,” the foregoing distinction is certainly 
helpful in determining whether the federal government possesses the funds at issue.  While labels 
are not always dispositive, it seems that in the context of federal trademarks, registration fees are 
just what they purport to be: private fees.  First, the payments are not compulsory; rather, these 
payments are more analogous to purchases, as only mark owners who voluntarily decide to seek 
the benefits of federal registration make them.  Second, there exists a direct relationship between 
the payment made and the particular service received in exchange for that payment: a PTO 
certificate of registration.  Most importantly, the payment of a Lanham Act registration fee does 
not provide funds to the federal government with the ultimate design that those funds be deposited 
in the Treasury and spent on federal programs at the government’s discretion.  Instead, these fees 
cover the costs of operating the PTO.194  In fact, patent and trademark registration fees together 
cover 100% of that cost.195 
             There is a small catch.  The amounts collected from patent and trademark registration fees 
actually constitute about 110% of the cost of running PTO operations.196  Through a controversial 
“surcharge” mechanism implemented by the federal government, it used to be the case that the 
remaining surplus of monies was “siphoned off” to finance other government programs.197  This 
concededly suggests that the federal government exercises at least some ownership and control 
over trademark (and patent) registration fees.  But in 1998, the surcharge experiment expired.198  
Now, theoretically, the remaining “extra” funds accumulated annually through the collection of 
PTO registration fees are made available to the PTO in the following fiscal year on a rollover 
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basis.199  While the diversion of these remaining funds to other federal programs has unfortunately 
continued despite the expiration of Congress’s controversial surcharge mechanism, such diversion 
is widely perceived as inappropriate and fundamentally unfair to patent and trademark holders.200  
As such, Congress has implemented movements to prevent further incidents of this diversion in 
the future.201    
D. Section 1052(a) Functions as a Coercive Penalty. 
Even assuming arguendo that section 1052(a) and the federal trademark registration system 
as a whole implicate public treasury funds to a constitutionally adequate degree, the statute must 
be invalidated as unduly coercive.  When Congress places a condition upon the receipt of federal 
benefits, it may not do so to the extent that the condition operates in practice as a compulsion.202  
In this regard, a fine line distinguishes a permissible non-subsidy from a coercive penalty.  Two 
seminal Supreme Court cases demonstrate this distinction: South Dakota v. Dole,203 and United 
States v. Butler.204   
             In Dole, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a federal law that withheld five percent 
of federal highway funds from any state that permitted persons less than twenty-one years of age 
to purchase alcohol.205  The Court did not find that the threatened withholding of funds was 
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sufficiently coercive to amount to a compulsion, thereby exceeding the bounds of Congress’s 
spending clause authority.206  Instead, the Court found that the law functioned merely as a financial 
inducement; while each state undoubtedly had an economic incentive to comply with Congress’s 
requested minimum drinking age, it also retained a realistic choice as to whether or not such 
compliance was worthwhile.207  Of course, the states remained free to seek highway revenue from 
other sources.   
             In United States v. Butler, by contrast, the Supreme Court invalidated the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act as an abuse of Congress’s spending power, partly because the Act attempted to 
use economic pressure as a form of coercion.208  The legislation at issue imposed a congressional 
“processing tax” on individual producers of agricultural commodities and redistributed the 
proceeds of that tax to those producers who agreed to reduce their net acreage.209  Unlike the South 
Dakota state government in Dole, the Supreme Court held that the individual farmers in Butler 
retained no realistic choice other than to accept the funds and reduce their output of crops.210  The 
amount of funds offered created sufficient pressure so as to amount to an impermissible 
compulsion, thus depriving the farmers of any viable alternatives.  The Court held that the 
involuntary nature of the “choice” at issue positioned each crop producer “between the rock and 
the whirlpool,” granting him “an ‘option’ to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood 
or submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden.”211 
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             Although section 1052(a) affects private, individual parties as opposed to state 
governments, the prohibitions therein nevertheless function as coercive penalties.  Dole and Butler 
illustrate that the primary factor distinguishing a non-subsidy from a penalty is whether the 
affected parties retain a realistic choice to decline the federal benefit in question and seek its 
equivalent elsewhere.212  Simply put, rejected trademark applicants have no such choice.  All 
funds—to a certain extent—are fungible; and in this regard, money is distinguishable from a 
certificate of federal trademark registration.  The latter is a unique bundle of rights offered solely 
by the PTO.  A rejected applicant has nowhere else to turn if his proposed mark fails to conform 
to the arbitrarily imposed standards of section 1052(a)’s scandalousness and disparagement 
prohibitions.  Thus, the traditional remedy of declining a benefit and seeking its equivalent 
elsewhere is simply unavailable.   
VI. CENTRAL HUDSON: WHY DOES IT ALL MATTER? 
 Because section 1052(a) imposes an unconstitutional condition that is unjustifiable as a 
non-subsidy, the provision must withstand constitutional scrutiny in order to pass muster.213  The 
initial matter to be decided is what level of constitutional scrutiny applies.   
As discussed supra, Mr. Tam’s proposed trademark goes beyond merely identifying his 
musical act commercially.214  Rather, his stated intent is to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of 
traditionally offensive Asian stereotypes, thereby asserting a societal message that Asian 
Americans should stand strong and be proud of their cultural heritage.215  Mr. Tam’s proposed 
                                                          
212 See supra notes 205–212 and accompanying text. 
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trademark and accompanying message therefore implicate racial, societal, cultural, and political 
issues—all of which comprise the “heartland” of speech entitled to First Amendment protection.216 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s ultimate disposition of Tam demonstrates that section 
1052(a)’s restrictions very likely constitute viewpoint-based regulations of speech subject to strict 
scrutiny.217  Pursuant to section 1052(a), it is permissible for a trademark applicant to register 
marks that refer to a particular group or idea in a positive manner, but it is not permissible for the 
same applicant to register a mark that refers to the same group or idea in a harmful, scandalous, or 
potentially disparaging manner.218  A listener’s probable reaction to expression is not a content-
neutral basis for regulation;219 rather, this criterion depends entirely on the content of the speaker’s 
message.  The government does not dispute that section 1052(a)’s underlying purpose is to deter 
the vilest messages from ever entering commerce in the first place.220  This conceded objective 
further solidifies section 1052(a) as a classic example of a restraint on speech that targets 
expressive content, thereby threatening to eliminate disfavored views from the marketplace of 
ideas.  However, because section 1052(a) fails to survive even the intermediate scrutiny ordinarily 
applied to restrictions of commercial speech, any argument for strict scrutiny becomes largely 
irrelevant. 
             As one of the single most important commercial assets a manufacturer or seller can own, 
a trademark undoubtedly falls within the definition of commercial speech.221  Central Hudson, the 
seminal case on First Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence, defines commercial speech 
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as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”222  
Similarly, Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. describes 
commercial speech as involving the “dissemination of information as to who is producing and 
selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.”223  The Supreme Court has at least once 
identified trademarks as commercial speech.224  After all, trademarks serve as commercial 
identifiers—symbols, words, pictures, and/or logos used to distinguish a company’s goods from 
those manufactured by others.225   
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court set forth a four-part framework to determine the 
constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions.  First, the speech at issue must concern 
otherwise lawful activity and not be misleading in order to come within the ambit of First 
Amendment protection.226  Second, courts must determine whether the government’s asserted 
interest underlying the restriction qualifies as “substantial.”227  Finally, the regulation must 
“directly advance” the asserted governmental interest in a manner that is not “more extensive than 
necessary.”228  As shown below, section 1052(a) fails to withstand intermediate scrutiny because 
the government is unable to assert a substantial interest in restricting scandalous and/or disparaging 
commercial speech.229  Therefore, it is unnecessary to even reach the third and fourth steps of the 
Central Hudson framework. 
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             Although the Lanham Act’s legislative history provides little to no indication of 
Congress’s intent in enacting section 1052(a), courts and scholars have manufactured three 
plausible purposes: (1) a desire to protect the public from disparaging or otherwise offensive 
trademarks; (2) a desire to refrain from “stamping the government’s imprimatur” on an offensive 
mark; and (3) a congressional choice not to subsidize offensive material with federal funds.230      
             Supreme Court precedent forecloses use of the first proposed governmental interest—
protection of the public welfare—as a legitimate legislative objective with regard to the 
suppression of commercial speech.231  It is a fundamental precept of First Amendment 
jurisprudence that the government may not suppress or burden speech merely because it is 
offensive to some viewers or listeners.232  Additionally, the government continues to argue that the 
refusal to register a trademark does not remove the allegedly scandalous or disparaging mark from 
commerce or otherwise limit its access to the general public in any meaningful manner.233  It is 
hypocritical for the government to argue that a denial of registration does not prevent a trademark 
applicant from nevertheless using his allegedly offensive speech in commerce, yet simultaneously 
accept the proposition that continuing to deny these registrations will protect the general public 
against offensive material.   
The second proposed governmental interest—the concern that trademark registration 
signifies the federal government’s “stamp of approval” on the mark’s offensive nature—has been 
largely discounted by relevant case law.  For instance, in Old Glory Condom, the TTAB stated the 
following:   
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The duty of this Office under the Trademark Act in reviewing 
applications for registration is nothing more and nothing less than to 
register those marks that are functioning to identify and distinguish 
goods and services in the marketplace . . . .  Just as the issuance of a 
trademark registration by this Office does not amount to a 
government endorsement of the quality of the goods to which the 
mark is applied, the act of registration is not a government 
imprimatur or pronouncement that the mark is a ‘good’ one in an 
aesthetic, or any analogous, sense.234 
 
In a manner consistent with Old Glory Condom, scholars have almost universally agreed that 
registration of a trademark should not signify political support for the mark any more than the 
PTO’s registration of a patent signifies endorsement of the underlying invention.235 
The third and final proposed governmental interest in support of section 1052(a)—a 
congressional choice not to use public funds to subsidize offensive commercial speech—no longer 
carries any weight.  In 1981, the CCPA stated that “the prohibition against registering scandalous 
marks was not ‘an attempt to legislate morality, but, rather, a judgment by the Congress that such 
marks not occupy the time, services, and use of funds of the federal government.’”236  The court 
provided a multitude of ways in which federal funds were spent in registering a trademark.237  
However, this justification for the abridgement of commercial speech no longer stands on firm 
ground.  Federal trademark registration is now funded almost entirely by user fees, and therefore 
costs the government very little money.238  In fact, multiple courts have stated that in light of the 
section 1052(a) appeal process, it frequently costs the government more money to refuse 
registration than it does to allow it.239 
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             It is all too easy to garner sympathy for those who take personal offense to allegedly 
scandalous or disparaging trademarks.  But the Lanham Act is not a proper vehicle through which 
these offended persons can constitutionally alleviate their frustrations.  Scholars have suggested 
that perhaps a more appropriate remedy lies within the operation of a free, unrestrained 
marketplace.240  In any event, the First Amendment protects not only harmless expression, but 
hurtful expression too.241  If the public debate rationale underlying the freedom of speech is to 
have any merit, then the American people as a culture must tolerate some insulting speech in order 
to provide adequate breathing room for the exercise of essential freedoms.242  The fact that Mr. 
Tam offended the public’s moral sensibilities merely demonstrates the expressive power of his 
band’s name and its inherent cultural message, as well as the expressive power of trademarks 
generally.243 
In denying federal registration to marks consisting of scandalous and/or disparaging subject 
matter, section 1052(a) of the Lanham Act significantly abridges trademark applicants’ First 
Amendment rights to free speech.  Although the Spending Clause authorizes Congress to condition 
the receipt of federal benefits upon the recipients’ relinquishment of constitutional rights under 
certain circumstances, section 1052(a) fails to meet these criteria.  That is because the provision is 
unduly coercive, and it fails to implicate funds of the federal treasury to a constitutionally adequate 
degree.  As an abridgement of commercial speech, section 1052(a) must withstand intermediate 
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scrutiny to pass constitutional muster.  The statute does not survive such scrutiny because the 
federal government has failed to articulate a substantial governmental interest for regulating 
scandalous and/or disparaging material in this manner.  As such, the longstanding Federal Circuit 
precedent of In re McGinley must be overruled and section 1052(a) must be invalidated as 
unconstitutional.   
